日期: 2024-08-17 15:47:27
《京城乔姐在SZH1020个人资料直播间网上的文化探索》
随着时代的发展，传统和现代交汇为中国乃至世界各地的社会提�shift。在这个充满变化与创意的今天，京城乔姐成为了一位受欢迎的直播嘉宾和文化交流者。SZH1020个人资料直播间网上，她以其独到的视角展现了丰富多彩的京城生活与传统文化。
第一段：京城乔姐的直播作远景
在SZH1020个人资料直播间网上，京城乔姐常通过她的直播平台来展示她对文化的热情。从古典音乐会到现代舞台表演，京城乔姐的直播内容是如此多元和富有视觉效果，让参与者不仅能体验到深度的文化体验，还可以从其中学习她对周游地点的热情介绍。在直播中，京城乔姐不仅描绘了历史文化遗产和现代艺术的交融，也展示了她对自然风光和都市景观的独特理解。
第二段：直播间作为文化交流平台
SZH1020个人资料直播间网是一个活跃且具有信息传播功能的新型创意生态。在这里，京城乔姐不难地与来自世界各地的观众交流，分享她对于当地文化和生活方式的理解。几乎每个节日、年祝典都有自己的视角与内容，使直播间成为一个不断开发新颖交流形式的聚集点。这不仅丰富了文化知识的传播，也吸引了来自世界各地粉丝群体和影� Written evidence (HMGB016) from: Lord Turner of Ecchinswell
The report on the Review of Regulation (No. 32) and subsequent regulatory reforms (“the review”), published in May 2019, outlined a number of recommendations for reforming financial regulation. It also identified several areas where there are issues that have yet to be resolved or fully addressed: the need for greater integration across existing agencies; improvements to risk-based supervision and oversight; better governance arrangements, particularly in relation to statutory bodies such as the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA); and enhancing accountability of regulators.
The FCA has been working hard on addressing these issues, including by undertaking a comprehensive review of its own structure which is now complete and led to significant changes in April 2019. The new organisation comprises four operating arms (A-D) with an overall governance framework based upon a single directorate (D4). There are still challenges ahead but we have made good progress so far, while retaining the strengths of our previous approach to regulation and oversight.
In this submission I set out what work has been undertaken by the FCA on each issue identified in the review. For those issues that remain unresolved there is also an indication of where we believe further action will be needed over time as well as my personal view on why these have not yet been fully resolved to our satisfaction.
Integrating and aligning regulatory functions across existing agencies
The first recommendation from the review was for a single regulator which would deliver financial stability (FS) alongside prudential oversight, with FS being an overarching goal. The FCA has considered this carefully in the context of its current responsibilities and has concluded that it is not possible to bring together these two regulatory functions into one supervisor without undermining our ability to deliver a strong regulatory framework for both financial stability (FS) and competition.
We have, however, been able to integrate key parts of the FS agenda across regulated activities in areas such as: creditworthiness; money laundering/terrorist financing; consumer protection; mis-selling; reporting obligations; capital management and funding; and business conduct. This integration is set out clearly within our regulatory standards and frameworks, but it also underpins how we design the way in which we supervenas our firms.
In parallel, there are other areas where cross-agency collaboration has been successful over recent years including: a common approach to risk management; a joined up approach for financial services providers when approaching the FCA and PRA; co-regulation of the insurance sector with Lloyds, Prudential Regulation Authority (PRA) and Financial Policy Committee (FPC); joint regulatory arrangements with other agencies such as the Bank of England's Payments System Regulator or HM Treasury for specific payment system policy.
Risk-based supervision and oversight
The second recommendation from the review was that risk should be at the heart of all decisions, including those on how to allocate regulatory resources. The FCA is already well down this route with our approach to business intervention and enforcement being increasingly informed by data analytics tools and a deep understanding of individual firms' risks.
We have also focused significantly on embedding risk-based supervision across all aspects of our work, including those outside the traditional perimeter for supervision (i.e. non-regulated entities). The FCA has been working with other agencies to develop and improve shared data systems; we are currently sharing detailed financial information between ourselves and PRA in relation to firms subject to prudential oversight by us, such as authorised sub-sellers or subsidiaries of banks.
Governance arrangements for statutitary bodies (such as the FCA)
The third recommendation from the review was that governance should be appropriate and fit for purpose, with a clear distinction between oversight and operational responsibilities at arms' length within regulation. The report also called for greater accountability across regulators including through statutory audits of performance in relation to outcomes rather than processes (i.e. outcome-based measures).
The FCA has responded to this recommendation by changing our governance arrangements, moving towards a model which provides clearer distinction between the roles and responsibilities for oversight and operational activities within statutory bodies such as us. We have recently published new Board papers that set out our approach (see Appendix B).
Our current governance structure comprises four arms of the FCA with an overall governance framework based upon a single directorate, D4:
D1 – Senior management oversight;
D2 – Executive leadership and strategic direction;
D3 – Operational responsibility for day-to-day delivery (A-D);
and D4 – The board which provides policy direction on the role of the regulator.
The new governance arrangements are designed to enhance transparency, accountability and oversight whilst maintaining our flexibility in how we deliver regulation for consumers and markets.
Outcome-based measures (OBMs)
A final recommendation from the review was that greater emphasis should be placed on outcome-based metrics as a way to assess regulators' performance; this would help address potential perverse effects of process compliance by focusing more attention on what is delivered for consumers and markets.
We are already well down this route with our approach to monitoring the effectiveness of regulation which we set out in our annual report and accounts (ARA) in Appendix C. We have also taken steps to ensure greater transparency in how we measure performance against regulatory objectives as part of our new governance arrangements, including:
- A more focused approach to measuring our effectiveness using outcome based measures;
- More frequent and meaningful reporting on the effectiveness of regulation (see Appendix C);
- Increasing emphasis on how we measure the success of regulatory interventions.
Enabling greater accountability across the system
The final recommendation from the review was that there should be a stronger focus on making regulators more accountable to policy makers and consumers by, for example: clarifying what each regulator's role is in financial stability; developing common outcomes measures shared with policymakers (e.g. Bank of England); strengthening independent assessments of the performance of regulators; and greater emphasis on how well FS policy goals are being achieved through sector-specific work by our competitors such as PRA or Prudential Regulatory Authority, for example.
The FCA has taken a number of steps towards enabling this outcome in recent years including:
- Developing the Financial Services Compensation Scheme (FSCS) and setting out its role within our regulatory framework;
- Clarifying our distinct contribution to financial stability within the Bank's strategy for financial policy and regulation.
- Publishing new annual reports on key elements of FS policy: competition, consumer protection, conduct and resilience;
- Taking an increasingly active approach in ensuring we are properly involved at all stages of policymakers' development of important initiatives such as the Bank's Financial Policy Committee (FPC) Strategy Update.
- Publishing our FSCS funding position every six months and publishing a new report on financial stability each year; and
- Establishing an independent Financial Stability Board to support its work, including by taking forward the Basel 2 recommendations in collaboration with HM Treasury and Bank of England.
We are also currently engaging across Government (e.g., through the FCA's formal sector consultation on the draft legislation for banking reform) but remain committed to making sure we are fully involved where appropriate throughout this process. In addition, we have made progress in working with other agencies as part of the Bank of England Payments System Regulator and HM Treasury (through Finan Adminstration Department).
Outstanding issues
Although we agree on many aspects of these recommendations I feel there are some that still remain open. In particular, where possible it is important to:
- Build greater understanding between regulators for the purposes of FS; this includes developing shared outcome based metrics (e.g., Bank of England's Financial Policy Committee);
- Strengthen our approach to cooperation on financial stability with other agencies and Government, including by making sure that all parts of government are properly engaged in future banking reform processes as appropriate; and
- Provide clearer guidance and direction for what is required from us (and other regulators) relating to competition policy. This would help address areas where further clarity remains on the FCA's role within a wider competitive framework, particularly across prudential regulation. For example, our current approach requires more explicit acknowledgement of the different roles we play in relation to competition and financial stability (in addition to our work around market conduct) by other regulators such as PRA and Bank of England's Financial Policy Committee, when they take decisions on prudential regulation.
Regulatory Framework for FSCS Funding Position and Financial Stability Report
In order to enhance transparency in the financial sector, it is crucial to have clear guidelines regarding the FSCS funding position and our role as a statutory body in the context of financial stability. This will contribute significantly to achieving outcomes that are more aligned with policymakers' objectives.
Clarifying Responsibilities for Regulating Competition Issues
The recent Bank of England review on competition issues highlighted the need for greater clarity in delineating responsibilities between regulators regarding specific areas such as consumer protection and prudential oversight. As a regulator, we believe that our approach should be distinct from other agencies' focus on market structure and competition. We advocate for maintaining separate functions to ensure effective oversight of financial stability within the broader framework set by policymakers.
Enhancing Clarity in Regulatory Role Definition
To improve clarity in defining our regulatory role, we are committed to enhancing transparency and collaboration with other agencies such as PRA. This will help establish a comprehensive understanding of the division of responsibilities in addressing competition-related issues within the financial sector. By fostering greater communication and alignment among regulators, we can ensure that our contributions effectively support policymakers' objectives while maintaining a distinct focus on FS oversight.
